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ESSAY 
FOCUSING ON HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY 
RATHER THAN LEGAL PERSONHOOD FOR 
NONHUMAN ANIMALS 
RICHARD L. CUPP, JR.** 
 
We should focus on human legal accountability for 
responsible treatment of nonhuman animals rather than 
radically restructuring our legal system to make them legal 
 
 This essay corresponds with two briefs by Steve Wise and Professor Larry 
Tribe. These briefs are published on PELR’s website: Steve Wise & Elizabeth 
Stein, Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition for Habeas Corpus, 33 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 542 (2016) (brief originally filed in Nonhuman Rights Project, 
Inc. v. Lavery, No. 162358/2015 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015)); Laurence H. Tribe, Letter 
Brief of Amicus Curiae Laurence H. Tribe in Support of Motion for Leave to 
Appeal, 33 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 661 (2016) (letter-brief originally filed in People 
ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 38 N.E.3d 828 (N.Y. 2015) (No. 
2015-293)). 
** John W. Wade Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. I 
thank the PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW and Steven Wise for inviting me to 
write this essay, and the Pepperdine University School of Law for providing a 
research grant in support of this essay and other publications. Thank you also to 
Jodi Kruger, Natalie Lagunas, and Samantha Parrish for providing consistently 
outstanding research assistance, to Naomi Goodno, David Han, Barry 
McDonald, and Robert Pushaw for providing feedback on a draft of this essay; 
and Justin Beck and Mark Scarberry for their thoughts and input regarding 
animal legal personhood. The input and assistance these individuals have 
graciously provided me do not necessarily reflect agreement with any or all of 
this Article’s theses. Most or much of this essay was also published addressing a 
previous manifestation of the lawsuit in Richard L. Cupp Jr., Human 
Responsibility, Not Legal Personhood, for Nonhuman Animals, 16 ENGAGE 34, 
38 (2015). Both essays draw heavily from the author’s comments in Animal 
Personhood: A Debate, http://www.fed-soc.org/multimedia/detail/animal-
personhood-a-debate-event-audiovideo, and both essays are largely excerpted 
from a more thorough article, Cognitively Impaired Humans, Intelligent 
Animals, and Legal Personhood, which will be made available at SSRN.com. 
1
CUPP - FINAL 5/4/2016  7:43 PM 
518 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  33 
persons.1  This essay, provided at the kind invitation of the Pace 
Environmental Law Review and Steven Wise, President of the 
Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc.,2 outlines a number of concerns 
about animal legal personhood. It does so primarily in the context 
of the plaintiff’s brief in The Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. 
Lavery, filed in the New York Supreme Court, New York County.3  
The first Lavery lawsuit (Lavery I) was filed in Fulton County in 
late 2013.4  After Lavery I was dismissed at the trial court and 
appellate levels, the second Lavery lawsuit (Lavery II) was filed in 
New York County in late 2015. The Pace Environmental Law 
Review is publishing a memorandum of law by Steve Wise and 
Elizabeth Stein in support of the petition for habeas corpus in 
Lavery II5 along with an amicus brief by Professor Laurence 
Tribe6 supporting the the appeal of Lavery I and this essay 
opposing the lawsuit. 
The arguments plaintiffs provide in their Lavery I brief and 
in their Lavery II brief feature many similar themes, but this 
essay will focus primarily on the language of the Lavery II brief, 
as it is the more recent. As with Lavery I, the Lavery II brief 
 
 1. For the sake of brevity I will hereafter refer to nonhuman animals as 
“animals.” 
 2. Hereafter “NhRP.” 
 3. Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition for Habeas Corpus, 
Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, No. 162358/2015 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015), 
http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Memo-of-
Law-Dec-2-2015.pdf[https://perma.cc/CM7V-P7US] [hereinafter Lavery II Brief]. 
The lower court dismissed the lawsuit, and the Nonhuman Rights Project has 
indicated it will file an appeal. See New York Trial Court Denies Tommy’s 
Second Bid for Freedom, NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT (Jan. 7, 2016), 
http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2016/01/07/new-york-court-denies-
tommys-bid-for-freedom/ [https://perma.cc/7DJH-LH4Y]. 
 4. See Petitioner’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Order to Show Cause 
& Writ of Habeas Corpus & Order Granting the Immediate Release of Tommy, 
Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 2014 N.Y. Slip Op 77524(U) (2014) 
(No. 518336), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/ 
12/Memorandum-of-Law-Tommy-Case.pdf [https://perma.cc/94RU-VC83] 
[hereinafter Lavery I Brief]. 
 5. Lavery II Brief, supra note 3. This will be published on PELR’s website at 
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/. 
 6. Letter Brief of Amicus Curiae Laurence H. Tribe in Support of Motion for 
Leave to Appeal, People ex. rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, No. 
518336/2015, (N.Y. 2015)  [hereinafter Tribe Letter Brief], http:// 
www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/7.-Exhibit-6-
Tribe-Amicus-Curiae-Letter-Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4JY-NJ5T]. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss3/5
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seeks a common law writ of habeas corpus for a chimpanzee 
named Tommy that was kept in upstate New York by a private 
individual.7  As with Lavery I, the Lavery II brief does not claim 
that any existing laws are being violated in the chimpanzee’s 
treatment. Rather, both the Lavery I and Lavery II briefs argue 
that the chimpanzee is entitled to legal personhood under liberty 
and equality principles.8  The Lavery II brief specifically asserts 
that he “possesses dozens of complex cognitive abilities that 
comprise and support his autonomy and bodily liberty. Moreover, 
he can shoulder duties and responsibilities both within 
chimpanzee societies and within human/chimpanzee societies.”9  
As with Lavery I, the Lavery II brief also asserts that Tommy is 
entitled to legal personhood under a New York statute allowing 
humans to create inter vivos trusts for the care of animals.10  
Both Lavery briefs seek to have the chimpanzee moved to a 
sanctuary that confines chimpanzees, but in a manner the briefs 
argue is preferable to the chimpanzee’s living situation when the 
lawsuits were filed.11 
The NhRP has filed several closely related lawsuits seeking 
legal personhood for chimpanzees, including Lavery I and Lavery 
II, in New York since late 2013.12  As of the writing of this essay, 
 
 7. See Lavery II Brief, supra note 3. The Nonhuman Rights Project reported 
in February 2016 that Tommy had been moved to a “roadside zoo” in Michigan. 
See Lauren Choplin, Update: Tommy, NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, (Feb. 16, 
2016), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2016/02/12/update-tommy/ 
[https://perma.cc/BPG5-HBAD]. 
 8. Lavery II Brief, supra note 3, at 102–10; Lavery I Brief, supra note 4, at 
55–77. 
 9. Lavery II Brief, supra note 3, at 113; see also Lavery I Brief, supra note 4, 
at 77 (“Tommy is possessed of autonomy, self-determination, self-awareness, 
and the ability to choose how to live his life, as well as dozens of complex 
cognitive abilities that comprise and support his autonomy.”). 
 10. Lavery II Brief, supra note 3, at 110–14; see also Lavery I Brief, supra 
note 4, at 49–52. 
 11. Lavery II Brief, supra note 3, at 6; Lavery I Brief, supra note 4, at 1. 
 12. People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project v. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248 
(App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2015); Nonhuman Rights Project v. Presti, 999 N.Y.S.2d 652 
(App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2015); Nonhuman Rights Project v. Stanley, 16 N.Y.S.3d 
898 (Sup. Ct. 2015); Order to Show Cause &Writ of Habeas Corpus, Nonhuman 
Rights Project v. Presti, No. 150149/2016, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 29, 2016), 
http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Decision-of-
Justice-Jaffe-dated-1.29.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/784U-3DRX]; Order to Show 
Cause & Writ of Habeas Corpus, Nonhuman Rights Project v. Lavery, No. 
162358 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 23, 2015), https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/fbem/ 
3
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all of the courts making decisions on the cases have rejected 
them.13 By the author’s count, at least twenty-three New York 
judges have participated in ruling against the lawsuits thus far.14 
A cursory history of the Lavery I and Lavery II lawsuits may 
be helpful for understanding the context of the Lavery II brief. 
After first being rejected by the Fulton County Supreme Court, 
Lavery I was again rejected by a unanimous five-judge panel of 
the New York State Supreme Court Appellate Division, Third 
Judicial Department, in People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, 
Inc. v. Lavery.15  In the Lavery I decision, the court emphasized 
that “collectively, human beings possess the unique ability to bear 
legal responsibility.”16 
The NhRP filed a motion for leave to appeal to the Court of 
Appeals of the State of New York,17 but the Court denied the 
 
DocumentDisplayServlet?documentId=2FAAP/keZ_PLUS_ptiKc1FQrdhQ==&sy
stem=prod [https://perma.cc/M6H9-JQZZ] [hereinafter Order to Show Cause & 
Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dec. 23, 2015)]. 
   In December 2015 the lower court dismissed Lavery II, and the 
Nonhuman Rights Project has indicated it will file an appeal. See New York 
Trial Court Denies Tommy’s Second Bid for Freedom, supra note 3.  In January 
2016, shortly after the dismissal of the Lavery II case, the Nonhuman Rights 
Project filed its most recent lawsuit. This one involves the same parties named 
in the Presti case, but was instead filed in New York County. See NhRP Re-Files 
Habeas Corpus Case on Behalf of Kiko in New York, NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT 
(Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2016/01/12/nhrp-re-files-
habeas-corpus-case-on-behalf-of-kiko-in-new-york/ [https://perma.cc/GZS4-
ZM8M]. A trial court judge dismissed this most recent lawsuit in January 2016, 
and the NhRP has indicated it will appeal. See New York Supreme Court Judge 
Denies Kiko’s Second Habeas Corpus Bid, NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT (Feb. 11, 
2016), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2016/02/11/new-york-trial-court-
denies-kikos-latest-habeas-corpus-bid/ [https://perma.cc/ZCV7-4HLQ]. 
 13. See supra note 12. 
 14. This includes one lower court judge each for Lavery I and the first Presti 
lawsuit, two lower court judges for the Stanley lawsuit (one of these judges, 
Justice Barbara Jaffe, dismissed three of the lawsuits: Stanley, Lavery II, and 
the second Presti lawsuit), five unanimous intermediate appellate judges each 
for the Lavery and Presti lawsuits, four intermediate appellate judges for the 
Stanley lawsuit, and at least five judges of the New York Court of Appeals in its 
decision denying the NhRP’s motion to appeal the intermediate appellate 
rulings in Lavery I and in the first Presti lawsuit. 
 15. People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project v. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248 
(App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2014). 
 16. Id. at 251 n.3. 
 17. Motion for Leave to Appeal & Affirmation in Support, Nonhuman Rights 
Project, Inc. v. Lavery, No. 518336/2015 (N.Y. App. Div. Feb. 23, 2015) 
http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/6.-Motion-
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss3/5
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motion in September 2015.18  The NhRP then filed Lavery II in 
New York County, providing additional expert affidavits and 
arguing that the Third Department’s appellate decision in Lavery 
I was wrongly decided.19  The trial court dismissed Lavery II in 
December 2015, writing only that it “[d]eclined, to the extent that 
the Third Dept. determined the legality of Tommy’s detention, an 
issue best addressed there, [and] absent any allegation or ground 
that is sufficiently distinct from those set forth in the first 
petition.”20  The NhRP has indicated that it will appeal this 
decision.21 
Although the NhRP has not yet succeeded in making animals 
legal persons in either Lavery case or any other lawsuits, these 
 
for-Leave-to-Appeal-and-Affirmation-in-Support.pdf [https://perma.cc/GC2Q-
SPJR]. 
 18. People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 38 N.E.3d 828 
(N.Y. 2015). On the same day, the New York Court of Appeals also denied a 
motion to appeal the intermediate appellate court decision in Presti. See 
Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Kiko v. Presti, 38 N.E.3d 827 (N.Y. 2015). 
 19. Lavery II Brief, supra note 3, at 72–85. 
 20. Order to Show Cause & Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dec. 23, 2015), supra 
note 12, at 2. 
 21. See New York Trial Court Denies Tommy’s Second Bid for Freedom, supra 
note 3. The trial court judge who dismissed Lavery II, Justice Barbara Jaffe, 
previously rejected the Stanley lawsuit that was also filed in New York County. 
Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Hercules & Leo v. Stanley, 16 N.Y.S.3d 
898, 918 (Sup. Ct. 2015). In rejecting Stanley, she found the Lavery I appellate 
decision to be controlling under stare decisis, and she indicated that the issue 
should be left to the legislature or to the New York Court of Appeals. Id. at 914–
17. Although the ruling emphasized that the law may evolve and took a 
sympathetic tone with some of the NhRP’s positions without highlighting some 
of the serious problems with the lawsuit, it did not advocate for animal legal 
personhood. See id. at 918. Rather, the decision in vague dicta seemed to imply 
support more generally for further consideration of the issue without staking out 
a position. See id. In further dicta, the decision expressly rejected using the past 
mistreatment of slaves, women, and other humans as an analogy for extending 
legal personhood to animals. Id. at 912. The NhRP has filed an appeal with the 
First Department. Notice of Appeal Filed in Hercules and Leo Case, NONHUMAN 
RIGHTS PROJECT (Aug. 20, 2015), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2015/ 
08/20/notice-of-appeal-filed-in-hercules-and-leo-case/ [https://perma.cc/9MP7-
FJB7]. Later, in January 2016, Justice Jaffe also rejected the second Presti 
lawsuit. See Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Presti, No. 150149/2016 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2016/01/Decision-of-Justice-Jaffe-dated-1.29.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
784U-3DRX]. Many of the legal documents associated with the chimpanzee 
lawsuits are available online. See Court Cases, NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, 
http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/category/courtfilings/ [https://perma.cc/ 
LB6G-4GTT]. 
5
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lawsuits are only the beginning of a long-term struggle, and the 
issue’s ultimate outcome is far from clear. Although the lawsuits 
are misguided in many ways, they should not be underestimated. 
The question of how we treat animals is exceptionally serious, 
both for animals and for human morality.22  The emotional 
appeal of doing something very dramatic in an effort to help 
animals, especially the animals that are most like us, is 
understandably strong to many people. This essay encourages 
greater empathy for animals, but introduces and briefly outlines 
several problems with the lawsuits and calls instead for a focus 
on evolving standards of human responsibility for animals’ 
welfare as a means of protecting animals rather than granting 
legal personhood to animals.23 
I.  ANIMAL LEGAL PERSONHOOD AS PROPOSED 
IN THE LAVERY LAWSUITS WOULD POSE 
THREATS TO THE MOST VULNERABLE HUMANS 
A danger that is underestimated and far out on the horizon 
may be more likely to advance from threat to harm than a similar 
danger that is immediate and clearly seen. One of the most 
serious concerns about legal personhood for intelligent animals is 
that it presents an unintended, long-term, and perhaps not 
immediately obvious threat to humans—particularly to the most 
vulnerable humans. 
Among the most vulnerable humans are people with 
cognitive impairments24 that may give them no capacity for 
autonomy or less capacity for autonomy than some animals, 
whether because of age (such as in infancy), intellectual 
disabilities, or other reasons.25  To be clear, supporting 
 
 22. As recognized by Immanuel Kant, “[H]e who is cruel to animals becomes 
hard also in his dealings with men.” IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 240 
(Louis Infield trans., Harper Torchbooks 1963) (1780). 
 23. This essay does not undertake to address all problems with the lawsuits. 
 24. This essay will use the term “cognitive impairments” to refer to all 
human cognitive limitations, including those related to childhood and 
intellectual disabilities, as well as being comatose or being impaired due to an 
injury, illness, or medical condition. 
 25. See Richard L. Cupp Jr., Cognitively Impaired Humans, Intelligent 
Animals, and Legal Personhood, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/ 
AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=543387 (forthcoming); Richard L. Cupp Jr., Children, 
Chimps, and Rights Arguments from “Marginal” Cases, 45 AZ. ST. L. J. 1 (2013) 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss3/5
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personhood based on animals’ intelligence does not imply that one 
wants to reduce the protections afforded humans with cognitive 
impairments. Indeed, my understanding is that the Lavery briefs 
seek to pull smart animals up in legal consideration, rather than 
to push humans with cognitive impairments down.26 
However, despite these good intentions, there should be deep 
concern that over a long horizon, allowing animal legal 
personhood based on cognitive abilities could unintentionally lead 
to gradual erosion of protections for these especially vulnerable 
humans. The sky would not immediately fall if courts started 
treating chimpanzees as persons. As noted above, that is part of 
the challenge in recognizing the danger. But, over time, both the 
courts and society might be tempted not only to view the most 
intelligent animals more like we now view humans but also to 
view the least intelligent humans more like we now view animals. 
 Professor Laurence Tribe has expressed concern that the 
approach to legal personhood set forth in a much-discussed book 
by Steven M. Wise might be harmful for humans with cognitive 
impairments. The book, Rattling the Cage, was published in 2000, 
 
[hereinafter Children & Chimps], for an in-depth discussion of the implications 
of cognitive impairments for young children and other humans. 
 26. The Lavery I brief states: 
Homo sapiens membership has been laudably designated a sufficient 
condition for legal personhood. Even the permanently comatose and 
anencephalic of our species, humans are entitled to fundamental 
legal rights under international and American law. However, “the 
thesis that humans should be ascribed rights simply for being 
human has received practically no support from philosophers.” 
Lavery I Brief, supra note 4, at 70 (citation omitted) (quoting Daniel Wikler, 
Concepts of Personhood: A Philosophical Perspective, in DEFINING HUMAN LIFE: 
MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 12, 19 (Margery W. Shaw & A. 
Edward Doudera eds., 1983). The Lavery I brief later states: 
The NhRP agrees that humans who have never been sentient nor 
conscious nor possessed of a brain should have basic legal rights. But 
if humans bereft of autonomy, self-determination, sentience, 
consciousness, even a brain, are entitled to personhood and legal 
rights, then this Court must either recognize Tommy’s just equality 
claim to bodily liberty or reject equality entirely. 
Lavery I Brief, supra note 4, at 73. The Lavery II brief has a virtually identical 
quote as well. Lavery II Brief, supra note 3, at 109 (“Humans who have never 
been sentient or conscious or possessed of a brain should have basic legal rights. 
But if humans bereft even of sentience are entitled to personhood, then this 
Court must either recognize Tommy’s just equality claim to bodily liberty or 
reject equality.”). 
7
CUPP - FINAL 5/4/2016  7:43 PM 
524 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  33 
and it broke new ground in setting forth arguments for intelligent 
animal legal personhood directed at a popular audience.;27 In 
2001 Professor Tribe stated “enormous admiration for [Mr. 
Wise’s] overall enterprise and approach,” but cautioned: 
[o]nce we have said that infants and very old people with 
advanced Alzheimer’s and the comatose have no rights unless we 
choose to grant them, we must decide about people who are 
three-quarters of the way to such a condition. I needn’t spell it 
out, but the possibilities are genocidal and horrific and 
reminiscent of slavery and of the holocaust.28 
 Mr. Wise later responded in part: “I argue that a realistic or 
practical autonomy is a sufficient, not a necessary, condition for 
legal rights. Other grounds for entitlement to basic rights may 
exist.”29  But Mr. Wise also noted that, in his view, entitlements 
to rights cannot be based only on being human.30  I did not find in 
the Lavery briefs an explanation of why, despite Mr. Wise’s 
apparent view, that being part of the human community is not 
alone sufficient for personhood; he and the NhRP think courts 
should recognize personhood in someone like a permanently 
comatose infant. If the argument is that the permanently 
comatose infant has rights based on dignity interests, but that 
dignity is not grounded in being a part of the human community, 
why would this proposed alternative basis for personhood only 
apply to humans and to particularly intelligent animals? Would 
all animals capable of suffering, regardless of their level of 
intelligence, be entitled to personhood based on dignity? If a 
rights-bearing but permanently comatose infant is not capable of 
suffering, would even animals that are not capable of suffering be 
 
 27. STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE (2000). 
 28. Laurence H. Tribe, Ten Lessons our Constitutional Experience Can Teach 
us About the Puzzle of Animal Rights: The Work of Steven M. Wise, 7 ANIMAL L. 
1, 7 (2001). Thank you to Justin Beck for highlighting this passage to me in 
conversation and in his presently unpublished paper addressing animal 
personhood issues. Justin Beck, The Gradual Move Toward Nonhuman 
Personhood: Assessing the Moral and Legal Implications of the New Animal 
Rights Movement 28–29, 54 (copy on file with author). 
 29. Steven M. Wise, Rattling the Cage Defended, 43 B.C. L. REV.. 623, 650 
(2002). 
 30. Id. at 650–51. I disagree with Mr. Wise and believe that treating humans 
distinctively makes sense because the human community is in fact distinctive in 
important aspects. See infra notes 32–59 and accompanying text. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss3/5
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entitled to dignity-based personhood under this position?31  The 
implications of some alternative non-cognitive approach to 
personhood that rejects drawing any lines related to humanity 
may be exceptionally expansive and problematic. 
 Further, good intentions do not prevent harmful 
consequences. Regardless of the NhRP’s views and desires 
regarding the rights of cognitively impaired humans, going down 
the path of connecting individual cognitive abilities to personhood 
would encourage us as a society to think increasingly about 
individual cognitive ability when we think about personhood. 
Over the course of many years, this changed paradigm could 
gradually erode our enthusiasm for some of the protections 
provided to humans who would not fare well in a mental 
capacities analysis. Deciding chimpanzees are legal persons based 
on the cognitive abilities we have seen in them may open a door 
that swings in both directions regarding rights for humans as 
well as for animals, and later generations may well wish we had 
kept it closed.32 
 
 31. In his book DRAWING THE LINE, Mr. Wise seems to argue that under 
equality principles, granting rights to a “baby born into a permanent vegetative 
state” or to a man with an IQ of ten supports granting rights to what he 
describes as “Category 2” animals in terms of autonomy values. See STEVEN M. 
WISE, DRAWING THE LINE: SCIENCE AND THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 238 (2002). 
In Category 2, he includes animals such as dogs, African Elephants, and African 
Grey Parrots, which are known to probably have relatively strong intelligence. 
Id. at 241. He also asserts that, with animals that are lower on the probability 
scale of practical autonomy, there is a point at which the disparities in 
autonomy between the animals and a man with very low intelligence “become 
small enough to allow a judge to distinguish rationally between that creature 
and a severely [mentally disabled] man. At some point, the psychological and 
political barriers to equality for a nonhuman animal with a low autonomy value 
become insuperable.” Id. at 238. But what if we consider the baby born into a 
permanent vegetative state instead of an adult with a severe cognitive disability 
(who may, despite his disability, have some abilities)? Would an equality 
argument based on individual autonomy, if accepted, suggest personhood for 
many, many more animal species that may have autonomy equal to or less than 
that of an adult with a severe cognitive disability but more autonomy than that 
of an infant born into a permanently vegetative state? In light of our recognition 
of the legal personhood of an infant born into a permanently vegetative state, 
how many (or how few) animals would not merit personhood if an equality 
argument based on individual autonomy were accepted? 
 32. Regarding a possible misconception that acknowledging personhood’s 
foundation in a societal framework of rights and responsibilities could somehow 
be a threat to humans without the capacity for responsibility, see infra Part III. 
9
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II. APPLAUDING AN EVOLVING FOCUS ON HUMAN 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANIMAL WELFARE 
RATHER THAN THE RADICAL APPROACH OF 
ANIMAL LEGAL PERSONHOOD 
 When addressing animal legal personhood, the proper 
question is not whether our laws should evolve or remain 
stagnant. Our legal system will evolve regarding animals and 
indeed is already in a period of significant change. One major 
reason for this evolution is our shift from an agrarian society to 
an urban and suburban society. Until well into the twentieth 
century, most Americans lived in rural areas. Most American 
families owned or encountered livestock and farm animals whose 
utility was economic. 
Now we are an urban and suburban society, and relatively 
few of us are directly involved in owning animals for economic 
utility. Rather, when most of us now encounter living animals, 
they are most frequently companion animals kept for emotional 
utility. Most of us view the animals in our lives as in terms of 
affection rather than as financial assets. As law gradually reflects 
changes in society, transformation in our routine interactions 
with animals doubtless has influenced the trend toward providing 
them more protections in many respects. 
 A second major reason we are evolving in our legal 
treatment of animals is the advancement of scientific 
understanding about animals. We are continually learning more 
about animals’ minds and capabilities. As we have gained more 
understanding of animals, we have generally evolved toward 
developing more compassion for them, and this increasing 
compassion has been, to some extent, and will continue to be, 
increasingly reflected in our protection laws.33 
 This evolution is a good thing, and it is probably still closer 
to its initial significant acceleration in the twentieth century than 
it is to a point where it will slow down. In other words, it seems 
quite probable that we will continue in a period of notable change 
 
 33. These bases for changing attitudes toward animal protection are also 
addressed in Richard L. Cupp Jr., Animals as More Than “Mere Things,” But 
Still Property”: A Call for Continuing Reform of the Animal Welfare Paradigm, 
CINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) [hereinafter “More Than Mere Things”], for a 
discussion on these bases for changing attitudes toward animal protection. 
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in our treatment of animals for some time.  We will continue 
evolving; the only question is how we should evolve. 
 Two unsatisfactory positions and a centrist position may be 
identified in answering this question. One unsatisfactory position 
would be clinging to the past and denying that we need any 
changes regarding how our laws treat animals. A second 
unsatisfactory position on the other extreme would be to radically 
reshape our understanding of legal personhood, with potentially 
dangerous consequences. 
 A centrist alternative to these extremes involves 
maintaining our legal focus on human responsibility for how we 
treat animals, but applauding changes to provide additional 
protection where appropriate. As emphasized by the Third 
Department in unanimously dismissing the NhRP’s Lavery 
appeal: “[o]ur rejection of a rights paradigm for animals does not, 
however, leave them defenseless.”34  When our laws or their 
enforcement do not go far enough to prevent animals from being 
mistreated, we should change our laws or improve their 
enforcement rather than assert that animals are legal persons. 
III. AMONG BEINGS OF WHICH WE ARE AWARE, 
APPROPRIATE LEGAL PERSONHOOD IS 
ANCHORED ONLY IN THE HUMAN MORAL 
COMMUNITY 
 As explained by the philosopher Carl Cohen, “[a]nimals 
cannot be the bearers of rights because the concept of right is 
essentially human; it is rooted in the human moral world and has 
force and applicability only within that world.”35 
 Our society and government are based on the ideal of moral 
agents coming together to create a system of rules that entail 
both rights and duties. Being generally subject to legal duties and 
bearing rights are foundations of our legal system because they 
are foundations of our entire form of government. 
 We stand together with the ideal of a social compact, or one 
might call it a moral community, to uphold all of our rights, 
 
 34. People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248, 
251 (Sup. Ct. 2014). 
 35. CARL COHEN & TOM REGAN, THE ANIMAL RIGHTS DEBATE 30 (2001). 
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including our inalienable rights.36  As stated in the Declaration of 
Independence, “to secure these rights, governments are instituted 
among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the 
governed.”37  One would be hard-pressed to convince most 
Americans that this is not important, as from childhood 
Americans learn it as a bedrock of our social structure. It is not 
surprising that the American Bar Association’s section 
addressing civil liberties was, until 2015, called “The Section of 
Individual Rights and Responsibilities.”38 
This does not require viewing every specific protection of a 
right as corresponding to a specific duty imposed on an 
individual. The connection between rights and duties for 
personhood is in some aspects broader and more foundational 
than that. It comes first in the foundations of our society, rather 
than solely in analysis of specific obligations and rights for 
persons governed by our laws. As the norm, we insist that 
persons in our community of humans and human proxies be 
subjected to responsibilities along with holding rights, regardless 
of whether a specific right or limitation requires or does not 
require a specific duty to go along with it. 
It misses the point to argue, as the NhRP seems to do in the 
Lavery II brief, that personhood is unrelated to duties because 
bodily liberty is an immunity right that does not require 
capacity.39  First, as noted elsewhere in this section, this is too 
 
 36. Of course, we have in some instances shamefully failed to follow this 
ideal, such as in allowing the odious institution of slavery. Because noncitizen 
humans, even noncitizen unlawful enemy combatants, are human, recognizing 
some rights for them is consistent with our foundational societal principles. We 
assert some responsibilities for noncitizens as they interact with our society in 
addition to recognizing that they have some rights as they interact with our 
society. See infra note 72. 
 37. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 38. See ABA H.D. 11-2 (2015), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
directories/policy/2015_hod_annual_meeting_11-2.docx [https://perma.cc/FY2N-
GVSK] (explaining that the name was being changed from the Section of 
Individual Rights and Responsibilities to the Section of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice because “[t]he Section's activities have always been grounded in 
Constitutional rights and principles, but have expanded beyond that,” leading to 
confusion regarding the section’s focus). 
 39. Lavery II Brief, supra note 3, at 80–81. Professor Hohfeld was also 
invoked in the plaintiff’s appeal of the Lavery I appellate decision. See 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Appellant’s Motion for Leave to Appeal to 
the Court of Appeals at 19–20, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 998 
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narrow a conceptualization of connections between rights and 
duties. Further, whether freedom from slavery requires capacity 
does not control the question of personhood, since cognitively 
impaired humans’ personhood is anchored in the responsible 
community of humans, even if they cannot make responsible 
choices themselves. The NhRP’s argument does not avoid the 
problem that a chimpanzee, although an impressive being we 
need to treat with exceptional thoughtfulness, should not be 
considered a person within our intrinsically human legal system, 
whereas humans with cognitive limitations should be recognized 
as persons. 
Professor Wesley Hohfeld wrote about the form of rights and 
duties between persons in the early twentieth century, and the 
NhRP’s Lavery II brief seeks to invoke his analysis to argue for 
chimpanzee legal personhood.40  Perhaps the most basic problem 
with the NhRP’s argument is that we are dealing with a question 
that must precede the Hohfeldian analysis of the forms of rights 
granted to persons. Professor Hohfeld’s description of rights 
assumed it was dealing with the rights of persons.41  Our issue 
revolves around who is a member of society eligible for those 
rights and protections; in other words, who is a person. This is a 
foundational question that is not answered by Hohfeldian 
analysis.42 
It is sometimes asserted that since we give corporations 
personhood, justice requires that we should give personhood to 
 
N.Y.S.2d 248 (App. Div. 2015) (No. 518336/2015), http:// 
www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/6.-Motion-for-
Leave-to-Appeal-and-Affirmation-in-Support.pdf  [https://perma.cc/TW4Y-
9HLT]. 
 40. Lavery II Brief, supra note 3, at 80–81. 
 41. Professor Hohfeld stated, “[S]ince the purpose of the law is to regulate the 
conduct of human beings, all jural relations must, in order to be clear and direct 
in their meaning, be predicated of such human beings.” Wesley Newcomb 
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 
YALE L.J. 710, 721 (1917). 
 42. “[S]ince Hohfeld's theory is largely descriptive, it does not really tell us 
what grounds our duties and, thus, what ultimately grounds rights. While 
Hohfeld's theory may help us to identify and explicate legal issues, it is not a 
method for determining social and legal philosophical issues.” Thomas G. Kelch, 
The Role of the Rational and the Emotive in a Theory of Animal Rights, 27 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 9 (1999). 
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intelligent animals.43  However, this argument ignores that 
corporations are created by humans as a proxy for the rights and 
duties of their human stakeholders.44  They are simply a vehicle 
for addressing human interests and obligations.45 
The Lavery II brief argues that “if humans bereft even of 
sentience are entitled to personhood, then this Court must either 
recognize Tommy’s just equality claim to bodily liberty or reject 
equality.”46  The Lavery I brief similarly argues that “if humans 
bereft of autonomy, self-determination, sentience, consciousness, 
even a brain, are entitled to personhood and legal rights, then 
this Court must either recognize Tommy’s just equality claim to 
bodily liberty or reject equality entirely.”47  Although not 
described as such in the Lavery I or Lavery II briefs, reasoning 
along these lines is often referred to by philosophers as “the 
argument from marginal cases.”48 
The concept of an “argument from marginal cases” has an 
unsettling tone, because most of us do not want to think of any 
humans as being “marginal.”49  The pervasive view that all 
humans have distinctive and intrinsic human dignity regardless 
of their capabilities may have cultural, religious, or even 
instinctual foundations. 
All of these foundations would on their own present huge 
challenges for animal legal personhood arguments to overcome in 
the real world of law, but they are not the only reasons to reject 
the arguments. Humans with cognitive impairments are a part of 
society’s community, even if their own agency is limited or 
nonexistent. Among the beings of which we are presently aware, 
humans are the only ones for whom the norm is capacity for 
moral agency sufficiently strong to function within our society’s 
legal system of rights and responsibilities. Further, it may be 
added that no other beings of which we are presently aware living 
 
 43. Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Moving Beyond Animal Rights: A 
Legal/Contractualist Critique, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 27, 51 (2009). 
 44. Id. at 52–53. 
 45. See id. at 52–63 (analyzing the history of corporate personhood being 
consistently defined as a proxy for human interests under all major theories 
seeking to explain corporate personhood). 
 46. Lavery II Brief, supra note 3, at 109. 
 47. Lavery I Brief, supra note 4, at 73. 
 48. See Children & Chimps, supra note 25, at 22–28. 
 49. Id. at 28–29. 
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today (even, for example, the most intelligent of all chimpanzees) 
ever meet that norm. Recognizing personhood in our fellow 
humans regardless of whether they meet the norm is a pairing of 
like “kind” where the “kind” category has special significance—
the significance of the norm being the only creatures who can 
rationally participate as members of a society subject to a legal 
system such as ours. 
Morally autonomous humans have unique natural bonds 
with other humans who have cognitive impairments, and thus 
denying rights to them also harms the interests of society—we 
are all in a community together. Infants are human infants and 
adults with severe cognitive impairments are humans who are 
other humans’ parents, siblings, children or spouses. 
We have all been children and we relate to children in a 
special way. Further, we all know that we could develop cognitive 
impairments ourselves at some point in our lives, and this 
reminds us that humanity is the most defining characteristic of 
persons with cognitive impairments. 
Thus, recognizing that personhood is anchored in the human 
moral world does not imply that humans with cognitive 
impairments are not persons or have no rights. As explained by 
Professor Cohen, “[t]his criticism . . . mistakenly treats the 
essentially moral feature of humanity as though it were a screen 
for sorting humans, which it most certainly is not.”50  It would be 
a serious misperception to view the appellate court’s decision in 
Lavery as actually threatening to infants and others with severe 
cognitive impairments in finding connections between rights and 
duties. This misperception would reflect an overly narrow view of 
how rights and duties are connected. 
Regarding personhood, they are connected with human 
society in general, rather than on an individual-by-individual 
capacities analysis.51  Again, appropriate legal personhood is 
anchored in the human moral community, and we include 
humans with severe cognitive impairments in that community 
because they are first and foremost humans living in our 
 
 50. COHEN & REGAN, supra note 35, at 37. 
 51. Of course, individual capacities are relevant to some specific rights (for 
example, the right to vote). They are not relevant to humans’ personhood. 
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society.52  Indeed, the history of legal rights for children and for 
cognitively impaired humans is a history of emphasis on their 
humanity.53  The Lavery court noted that “[t]o be sure, some 
humans are less able to bear legal duties or responsibilities than 
others. These differences do not alter our analysis, as it is 
undeniable that, collectively, human beings possess the unique 
ability to bear legal responsibility.”54 
 
 52. Further, the status quo views humans as persons based on their 
humanity, and infants and other cognitively impaired persons are 
unquestionably included. It is rejecting this status quo in favor of an approach 
that denies membership in the human community as the foundation for 
personhood that would create risk for cognitively impaired humans, not 
maintaining the status quo. 
 53. See RICHARD FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS: A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN 1 
(1978) (asserting that denying rights to children denies “their right to full 
humanity”). 
 54. People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248, 
251 n.3 (Sup. Ct. 2014). . In Professor Tribe’s Amicus Curiae Letter Brief in 
support of NhRP’s motion for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, 
he raises two common theoretical conceptualizations of the function of human 
rights that are debated by academic philosophers and other theorists: the 
“interest theory” and the “will theory.” Tribe Letter Brief, supra note 6, at 8–10. 
The will theory “asserts that the function of a right is to give its holder control 
over another's duty.” Leif Wenar, Rights, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY § 2.2 (Edward N. Zaita ed., 2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
entries/rights/#2.2 [https://perma.cc/JK87-9SN6]. The interest theory maintains 
that “the function of a right is to further the right-holder's interests.” Id. 
Philosophers and other academicians have squabbled over whether one of these 
theories provides a better accounting of the function of rights than the other 
“literally for ages.” Id. Both theories are problematic if rigidly applied. For 
example, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy notes that “the interest 
theory is also misaligned with any ordinary understanding of rights.” Id. In any 
event, although one could argue that animals have interests and thus should 
have some form of “rights” under an expansive view of the interest theory that 
goes beyond its usual focus on humans and human proxies, such a conclusion is 
not in any way compelled under the theory. See J. Raz, On the Nature of Rights, 
93 MIND 194, 204 (1984) (a prominent interest theory proponent noting that 
“[t]he definition of rights itself does not settle the issue of who is capable of 
having rights beyond requiring that right-holders are creatures who have 
interests. What other features qualify a creature to be a potential right-holder is 
a question bound up with substantive moral issues.”). Professor Tribe asserts 
that even under will theory, which may be viewed as a more restrictive 
perspective on the function of rights, it is: 
unsustainable to equate legal personhood with rights-holding 
because the class of potential rights-holders under that definition 
would exclude what our culture universally regards as legal persons. 
Needless to say, infant children and comatose adults are 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss3/5
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IV. THE LAVERY II BRIEF FAILS TO RECOGNIZE 
THE DISTINCTIVE NATURE OF HUMANS’ 
CAPACITY TO BEAR LEGAL DUTIES 
 The most notable distinction between the Lavery II brief 
and the Lavery I brief is that the Lavery II brief seeks to utilize 
additions to previous expert affidavits and some new expert 
affidavits to strengthen the argument already made in the Lavery 
I brief that chimpanzees have some sense of moral responsibility 
in their relationships.55  This is in response to the Lavery court’s 
unanimous decision recognizing that chimpanzees are not 
persons in our legal system because they are not capable of 
bearing legal duties.56 
 Whether chimpanzees have some quality that could be 
described as a sense of moral responsibility in their relationships 
is quite obviously not the pertinent question regarding legal 
personhood under our human legal system. Ants, whose ability to 
work together for the greater good of their colony is observable 
even by non-experts, could probably be described as having 
something like a sense of responsibility toward the other ants in 
their colony or to the colony as a whole. Across many species of 
animals, mothers and, among some species, fathers demonstrate 
characteristics that probably could be described in terms of a 
sense of responsibility for their young offspring. Perhaps any type 
of mature animal that lives cooperatively in some kind of family 
 
paradigmatic legal persons. Yet they certainly do not possess what 
will theorists would deem rights. 
Tribe Letter Brief, supra note 6, at 9. But this line of argument undervalues 
courts’ consistent emphasis on humanity’s centrality to personhood.  Our courts 
have appropriately recognized that there is something distinctive in humanity. 
As discussed above, this perception of distinctiveness may have cultural, 
religious or even instinctual foundations, but infants and comatose humans 
should also be considered first as humans rather than by their limitations 
because they are factually part of society’s community, even if they cannot 
themselves act as moral agents. See supra notes 32–47 and accompanying text. 
Further, courts of course appropriately do not tend to declare allegiance to 
either of these competing academic philosophical theories in addressing rights. 
Courts are, to say the least, not rigidly beholden to conflicting academic 
philosophical theories. 
 55. See, e.g., Lavery II Brief, supra note 3, at 16–17. Although the argument 
is emphasized less in Lavery I, the Lavery I brief also argues that chimpanzees 
have moral agency. See, e.g., Lavery I Brief, supra note 4, at 44. 
 56. Lavery, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 251. 
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or group could be described as normally having something like a 
sense of responsibility to the other animals in the family or group. 
  But of course we do not assign legal duties to ants or to any 
other nonhuman animals. The pertinent question is not whether 
chimpanzees possess anything that could be characterized as a 
sense of responsibility, but rather whether they possess sufficient 
moral responsibility to be held legally accountable as well as to 
possess legal rights under our human legal system. When, in 
2012, an adult chimpanzee at the Los Angeles Zoo beat a three-
month-old baby chimpanzee in the head until the baby died, 
doubtless no authorities seriously contemplated charging the 
perpetrator in criminal court.57  Similarly, when, in 2009, a 
chimpanzee attacked a woman in a manner that police described 
as “unprovoked” and as “brutal and lengthy,” causing severe, life-
threatening injuries, doubtless no authorities seriously 
considered bringing criminal battery charges against the 
chimpanzee.58 
 According to the NhRP website, NhRP President Steven 
Wise has a poster at his home office that reads “[w]e may be the 
only lawyers on earth whose clients are always innocent.”59  This 
makes the point. Our legal system appropriately does not view 
chimpanzees as possessing sufficient moral agency to be 
accountable under our human legal system. A typical prosecutor 
in the United States would not even entertain the idea of seeking 
to impose legal responsibilities on chimpanzees based on the 
concept of moral responsibility.60  Whether chimpanzees possess 
 
 57. Adult Chimpanzee Kills Baby Chimp in Front of Shocked Los Angeles Zoo 
Visitors, CBS NEWS (June 27, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/adult-
chimpanzee-kills-baby-chimp-in-front-of-shocked-los-angeles-zoo-visitors/ 
[https://perma.cc/AK4E-Z3GS]. 
 58. Stephanie Gallman, Chimp Attack 911 Call: ‘He's Ripping Her Apart’, 
CNN (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/02/17/chimpanzee.attack/ 
index.html?iref=24hours [https://perma.cc/SS3H-MQTJ]. 
 59. Michael Mountain, At Sundance, A Triumph for “Unlocking the Cage”, 
NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT (Jan. 29, 2016), http:// 
www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2016/01/29/at-sundance-a-triumph-for-
unlocking-the-cage/ [https://perma.cc/QY9S-ZAJE]. 
 60. Authorities restrain, confine, or even kill chimpanzees and other animals 
if they are a threat to humans or to other animals (whether ever killing a violent 
chimpanzee is ever appropriate is highly questionable, other than in a situation 
involving an imminent and very serious threat where no other options are 
available). This is based on a perceived need to protect humans, animals, or 
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some degree of a quality that could be described as moral 
responsibility is irrelevant; they can only interact with our society 
in a manner that suggests they should be legal persons with 
rights and duties if they have sufficient moral responsibility to be 
held accountable under our laws. 
 The Lavery II brief also argues that the two law review 
articles cited by the Lavery court “merely set forth Professor 
Cupp’s personal preference for an exceedingly narrow branch of 
philosophical theory of contractualism that arbitrarily excludes 
every nonhuman animal, while including every human being, in 
support of which he cites no cases.”61  An amicus brief filed 
opposing the appeal of Lavery I responded to a similar assertion 
by the NhRP that practically no philosophers have supported 
“rights for being human” by pointing out “the vast western 
philosophical canons to the contrary.”62 
But at an even more fundamental level, noting that courts do 
not feel bound by strict adherence to academic philosophical 
theories would be an understatement. Philosophical theories may 
be useful in some endeavors, such as understanding or explaining 
the foundations of a society, but abstract theoretical philosophy is 
merely a tool at best. Judges seek justice at a broad level 
influenced by a multitude of factors, rather than deferring to the 
shifting sands of current majority, minority, and majority and 
minority branch positions among theoretical academic 
philosophers, most of whom have no legal training. 
Similarly, my observations and analyses regarding our 
society and legal system broadly connecting the concepts of rights 
and duties since our foundation as a nation are not a call for 
judicial endorsement of any formal academic philosophical 
theories—or their branches—in all of their particulars. As 
articulated throughout this essay and my other writings, focusing 
legal personhood on humans and their proxies among the beings 
 
property, rather than based on a conclusion that the animal is morally 
blameworthy. 
 61. Lavery II Brief, supra note 3, at 76. 
 62. Brief of Amicus Curiae Bob Kohn Against Issuance of Writ of Habeas 
Corpus at 17, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, No. 518336/2014, (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2014), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2014/06/16.-Brief-of-amicus-curiae-Bob-Kohn-against-issuance-of-writ-of-
habeas-corpus..pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4SQ-Z6NQ]. 
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of which we are presently aware is not arbitrary, but rather a 
recognition that requiring legal accountability to each other as 
the norm in a community of humans is at the core of our human 
society and its legal system. 
 The history of rights expansion has been a history of 
focusing on the humanity of those who were previously denied 
rights. While there may be no case law before Lavery expressly 
rejecting habeas corpus for animals because no reported lawsuits 
had previously made such a radical assertion, courts have readily 
rejected analogous claims. For example, when a lawsuit was 
brought seeking application of the Thirteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States to orcas held in captivity, a 
district court dismissed the lawsuit in a short opinion because the 
Thirteenth Amendment “applies to persons, [sic] and not to non-
persons such as orcas.”63 
 Finally, as explained by Justice Jaffe in rejecting Lavery II, 
the Lavery II brief and its affidavits fail to provide “any allegation 
or ground that is sufficiently distinct from those set forth in the 
first petition.”64  An argument that chimpanzees are capable of 
bearing some sorts of responsibilities was previously made, albeit 
with less emphasis, in the Lavery I brief that was unanimously 
rejected in the Lavery appellate decision.65 
 
 63. Tilikum ex rel. PETA, Inc. v. Sea World Parks & Entm’t Inc., 842 F. 
Supp.2d 1259, 1263 (S.D. Cal. 2012). 
 64. Order To Show Cause & Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dec. 23, 2015), supra 
note 12, at 2. 
 65. For example, the Lavery I brief stated: 
Chimpanzees appear to have moral inclinations and some level of 
moral agency; they behave in ways that, if we saw the same thing in 
humans, we would interpret as a reflection of moral imperatives 
(McGrew Aff. at ¶26). They ostracize individuals who violate social 
norms (McGrew Aff. at ¶26). They respond negatively to inequitable 
situations, e.g. when offered lower rewards than companions 
receiving higher ones, for the same task (McGrew Aff. at ¶26). When 
given a chance to play economic games, such as the Ultimatum 
Game, they spontaneously make fair offers, even when not obliged to 
do so (McGrew Aff. at ¶26). 
Lavery I Brief, supra note 4, at 32. 
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V. HOW FAR MIGHT ANIMAL PERSONHOOD AND 
RIGHTS EXTEND? 
 The NhRP has stated that a goal of using these lawsuits is 
to break through the legal wall between humans and animals.66  
But we have no idea how far things might go if the wall comes 
down. One might suspect that many advocates would push for 
things to go quite far. 
 As noted above, in the real world, law does not fit perfectly 
with any single philosophical theory or other academic theory 
because judges must be intensely conscious of the practical, real 
world consequences of their decisions. One practical consequence 
courts should expect if they break through the legal wall between 
animals and humans is the opening of a floodgate of expansive 
litigation without a meaningful standard for determining how 
many of the billions of animals in the world are intelligent 
enough to merit personhood. We should not fool ourselves into 
minimizing the implications of these lawsuits by thinking that 
they are, in the long run, only about the smartest animals. 
 How many species get legal personhood based on 
intelligence is just the start. Once the wall separating humans 
and animals comes down, that could serve as a stepping stone for 
many who advocate a focus on the capacity to suffer as a basis for 
granting legal personhood. Animal legal rights activists do not all 
see eye to eye regarding whether they should focus on seeking 
legal standing for all animals who are capable of suffering or on 
legal personhood and rights for particularly smart animals like 
chimpanzees. However, these approaches may only be different 
beginning points with a similar possible end point. 
 The intelligent animal personhood approach is more 
pragmatic in the short term, because the immediate practical 
consequences of granting legal standing to all sentient animals 
could be immensely disruptive for society.67  We do not have 
 
 66. “Our goal is, very simply, to breach the legal wall that separates all 
humans from all nonhuman animals.” Michael Mountain, Lawsuit Filed Today 
on Behalf of Chimpanzees Seeking Legal Personhood, NONHUMAN RIGHTS 
PROJECT (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2013/12/02/ 
lawsuit-filed-today-on-behalf-of-chimpanzee-seeking-legal-personhood/ 
[https://perma.cc/6BDE-85B8]. 
 67. See Children & Chimps, supra note 25, at 21. The Manhattan Stanley 
ruling asserted in a footnote that “the floodgates argument is not a cogent 
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much economic reliance on chimpanzees, there are relatively few 
of them in captivity compared to many other animals, and we can 
recognize that they are particularly intelligent and closer to 
humans than are other animals. Thus, perhaps a court could be 
tempted to believe that granting personhood to chimpanzees 
would be a limited and manageable change. If that were accepted 
as a starting position, there is no clear or even fuzzy view of the 
end position. It would at least progress to assertions that most 
animals utilized for human benefit have some level of autonomy 
interests sufficient to allow them to be legal persons who may 
have lawsuits filed on their behalf on that basis. Professor 
Richard Epstein has recognized the slipperiness of this slope, 
pointing out that “[u]nless an animal has some sense of self, it 
cannot hunt, and it cannot either defend himself or flee when 
subject to attack. Unless it has a desire to live, it will surely die. 
And unless it has some awareness of means and connections, it 
will fail in all it does.”68 
 Opening the personhood door to the more intelligent 
animals would also encourage efforts to extend personhood on the 
basis of sentience rather than solely seeking extensions based on 
autonomy. The implications of much broader potential expansion 
of legal personhood based on either autonomy definitions or 
sentience could be enormous, and society should carefully think 
them through. Any court that contemplates making this 
restructuring of our legal system must also contemplate the 
practical consequences. 
 
reason for denying relief.” Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Stanley, 16 
N.Y.S.3d 898, 917 n.2 (Sup. Ct. 2015). The judge cited Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
570 N.E.2d  198, 204 (N.Y. 1991) (Hancock, J. dissenting), which involved a 
proposed tort law expansion. Although no pinpoint citation was provided, 
apparently the judge was referencing the dissent in Enright. Id. Interestingly, 
the majority opinion in Enright found it appropriate to consider what it viewed 
as “staggering implications” of the proposed expansion, and the difficulty, if the 
expansion were accepted, “of confining liability by other than artificial and 
arbitrary boundaries.” Id. at 201. In the NhRP lawsuits, courts must consider 
that there is no basis for determining how far to extend legal personhood among 
the world’s billions of animals if personhood is grounded in a vague intelligence 
standard. 
 68. Richard A. Epstein, Animals as Objects, or Subjects, of Rights, in ANIMAL 
RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 154 (Cass R. Sunstein & 
Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004). 
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VI.  THE POLITICAL PROCESS IS IMPORTANT IN 
ADDRESSING THIS TYPE OF PROPOSED 
CHANGE 
 As noted above, it seems quite likely that Americans will 
continue to push for more protections of animals through the 
democratic process, and that is a good thing. But of course most 
citizens would oppose making animals legal persons, and courts 
need to demonstrate restraint and to respect the democratic 
process. Courts applying common law do not always need to wait 
for legislatures to act, but the more monumental the potential 
change, and the more it would violate the views of most citizens, 
the more thoughtful courts need to be about whether it is 
appropriate for them to make the change. 
VII. A FEW WORDS ABOUT THE COMMON LAW WRIT 
OF HABEAS CORPUS IN LAVERY 
 Professor Tribe has argued that the Lavery appellate court 
decision misunderstood the “crucial role” the common law writ of 
habeas corpus has historically played in “providing a forum to 
test the legality of someone’s ongoing restraint or detention.”69  
He also says that it serves as “a crucial guarantor of liberty by 
providing a judicial forum to beings the law does not (yet) 
recognize as having legal rights and responsibilities on a footing 
equal to others.”70 
 The common law writ of habeas corpus has indeed served 
as a vehicle for humans to test the legality of ongoing restraint. 
However, humans are not simply “beings,” they are human 
beings, and their legal personhood is anchored in the human 
community. If habeas corpus jurisdiction were to be granted for 
any beings for whom an advocate wished to test the legality of 
restraint, would it be available for earthworms restrained in 
containers to be sold at gardening stores? If courts began to 
broadly allow habeas writs to test the legality of any nonhuman 
being’s restraint, and then focused only on the scope of habeas 
corpus relief to limit boundaries, they could be flooded with 
habeas corpus claims for countless animals. 
 
 69. Tribe Letter Brief, supra note 6, at 3. 
 70. Id. at 4. 
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 The New York habeas corpus statute states that a “person” 
or one acting on the person’s behalf may petition for the writ.71  
Thus, the jurisdiction question is related to the ultimate question 
of legal personhood under the statute’s language. Boundaries are 
needed for jurisdiction as well as for substantive relief, and, 
among the beings of which we are presently aware, habeas corpus 
should be grounded only in the human community.72 
VIII. ANIMAL TRUSTS DO NOT CREATE NEW LEGAL  
PERSONS 
 The Lavery I brief and the Lavery II brief argue that 
animals are already recognized as legal persons in New York. 
They assert that a New York state statute allowing humans to 
create an inter vivos trust for their companion animals or other 
animals makes the animals beneficiaries, and that “only ‘persons’ 
may be trust beneficiaries.”73  But when a state permits people to 
create trusts to care for animals, the legislative intent is not to 
declare that the animals are now legal persons with autonomy 
rights. Rather, the intent is doubtless to give humans peace of 
mind in knowing that their beloved animals will be cared for after 
they pass away, as well as to facilitate good care for animals. 
Further, as explained by New York Assistant Attorney General 
Christopher Coulston in opposing this argument in one of the 
related chimpanzee cases, elsewhere a New York statute defines 
the term “animal,” which is used repeatedly in the companion 
animal inter vivo trust statute, as “every living creature except a 
human being.”74 
 
 71. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7002(a) (MCKINNEY 2012). 
 72. This is not inconsistent with allowing habeas corpus and personhood for 
detainees held by the United States at Guantanamo Bay. See Boumediene v. 
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008). The detainees are human. Although American 
courts have in some situations not granted full personhood to some subsets of 
humans (such as when the odious practice of slavery was an American 
institution), because of personhood’s focus on humanity American courts have 
never extended personhood beyond humans and human proxies. See also supra 
note 36. 
 73. Lavery I Brief, supra note 4, at 50; see also Lavery II Brief, supra note 3, 
at 72. 
 74. Respondent’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Petition for a 
Writ of Habeas Corpus & in Support of their Cross-Motion to Change Venue to 
Supreme Court, Suffolk County at 16, Nonhuman Rights Project v. Stanley, No. 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss3/5
CUPP - FINAL 5/4/2016  7:43 PM 
2016] FOCUSNG ON HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY 541 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
 Recognizing that personhood is a fit for humans rather 
than animals in our legal system does not limit us to considering 
animals as “mere things” with the same status as inanimate 
objects. “Mere things” do not have laws protecting them. This is 
not an argument that we have done enough for animals. Society 
is increasingly interested in protecting animals through law, and 
we should continue to develop our protections. As noted above, in 
some areas, our laws have not yet caught up with our evolving 
views on the protection of animals and quite a bit of evolution is 
likely still ahead even from an animal welfare perspective.75 
 Felony animal cruelty statutes provide a hopeful example 
of the kind of evolution that we have experienced and likely will 
continue to experience without restructuring our legal system to 
divorce personhood from humans and human proxies. Twenty-
five years ago few states made felony status available for serious 
animal cruelty.76  A misdemeanor was the most serious charge 
available in most states. However, by 2014, our laws in this area 
had dramatically evolved. In that year, South Dakota became the 
last of all states to make serious animal cruelty eligible for felony 
status.77  We need to continue evolving our legal system like this 
to provide more protection to animals where appropriate, not 
because animals are legal persons, but because humans need to 
be responsible in their treatment of animals. 
 
 
152736/2015 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 22, 2015) (citing N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 350 
(McKinney 2015)), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2015/05/Reply-Brief-from-AG-5-22-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8JC-BKE6]. 
 75. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. I argue this point in more 
depth and provide suggestions for some types of changes courts and legislatures 
should make in framing animals’ property status in More than Mere Things, 
supra note 33. 
 76. The Animal Legal Defense Fund has gathered information about the year 
each state adopted felony animal cruelty provisions. See Jurisdictions With 
Felony Animal Cruelty Provisions, ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND (Apr. 2012), 
http://aldf.org/downloads/Felony_Status_List%204-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
YP8L-5EBR] . According to the website’s list, as of 1990, only six states had 
adopted felony animal cruelty provisions. Id. 
 77. South Dakota is Last State to Make Animal Cruelty a Felony, J. AM. 
VETERINARY MED. ASS’N NEWS (June 15, 2014), https://www.avma.org/News/ 
JAVMANews/Pages/140615f.aspx [https://perma.cc/YB7N-AAD4]. 
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